




Inequality and the Emergence of Vigilante Organizations:  
The Case of Mexican Autodefensas  
 
 
Version accepted at Comparative Political Studies 
2016 
 
Brian J. Phillips 







ABSTRACT: What explains the emergence of vigilante organizations? Throughout the 
world, vigilantes emerge to illegally punish perceived criminals, often leading to serious 
consequences. However, the literature presents partial and conflicting explanations for this 
phenomenon. This article argues that local economic inequality creates a situation ripe for 
vigilante organizations. Inequality creates demand for vigilantism because poorer citizens 
feel relatively deprived of security compared to wealthier neighbors who have advantages 
regarding private and public security. Additionally, inequality suggests a patron-and-
worker distribution of labor, and this is ideal for organizing a particular type of group, the 
patron-funded vigilante group. Empirical tests use original data on the 2013 wave of 
Mexican vigilante organizations, present in 13 of Mexico’s 32 federal entities. Municipal-
level income inequality is robustly associated with organized vigilantism. Less support is 
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I. Introduction 
What explains the emergence of vigilante organizations? Vigilantism is important to 
understand because it represents a challenge to rule of law and governance. In a number of 
countries, it appears to be increasing (Ungar, 2007; Honorine, 2013). Some research 
suggests vigilantism can reduce crime (Osorio, Schubiger, & Weintraub, 2015). However, 
vigilante organizations are often responsible for serious human rights violations, and their 
behavior can lead to tit-for-tat escalations of violence (Abrahams, 1987, p. 186; Romero, 
2003; Conaway, 2004). Furthermore, these groups sometimes turn into other types of 
nefarious actors, such as drug-traffickers or extortionists. In spite these reasons to 
understand vigilantism, the literature offers contrasting explanations for this behavior 
(Baker, 2004; Handy, 2004; Godoy, 2006; Bateson, 2013). There have been few attempts to 
rigorously evaluate claims for why vigilantism occurs.  
This article argues that local economic inequality plays an important role in 
explaining why some areas experience vigilantism and others do not. Economic inequality 
implies security inequality, and two related mechanisms can produce organized vigilantism. 
First, there is a greater demand for organized vigilantism in unequal localities because 
lower-income citizens feel relatively insecure compared to wealthier neighbors, who have 
greater access to private and public security. Vigilantism is one way poorer citizens can 
mitigate the security gap, the relative deprivation of security. Second, economic inequality 
provides a distribution of labor that is useful for organizing a particular type of vigilante 
group. When wealthier citizens seek out private security, one option is mobilizing their own 
vigilante group. This has occurred as business owners, for example, form an ad hoc force to 
protect their economic interests. However, regardless of the funding or organizational 
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structure of vigilantism, economic inequality and the security inequality it implies should 
lead to more organized vigilantism. 
The argument is tested quantitatively with original data on the autodefensa (self-
defense) organizations that appeared throughout in Mexico in 2013. The subnational 
comparative approach offers a number of advantages over other types of studies (Snyder, 
2001), and Mexico is an important and interesting case. After years of violence connected 
to drug-trafficking organizations in the country, a wave of organized vigilantism occurred, 
with groups forming in more than 70 municipalities, in 13 of Mexico’s 32 federal entities. 
Why did groups form in certain areas, but not others? Interestingly – and as is the case in 
other countries – the vigilante organizations did not appear in the parts of the country with 
the highest crime, or in the areas with the weakest state presence. The Mexico case shares a 
number of attributes with other developing countries experiencing higher levels of crime, 
so it can inform the study of other cases as well. 
The topics of how citizens react to crime, and economic inequality, speak to several 
important political science debates. Crime and crime victimization affect political 
participation in meaningful ways (Bateson, 2012; Trelles & Carreras, 2012). Assuming that 
vigilantism is a type of political participation, how should crime affect the likelihood of the 
appearance of vigilante organizations? Regarding economic inequality, this is an important 
causal factor for many outcomes of interest, such as democratization (Boix, 2003; Ansell & 
Samuels, 2010) and taxation (Mares & Queralt, 2015). However, inequality has fallen out 
of favor as an explanation for violence such as civil war, as it is usually not correlated with 
conflict onset in large-n studies (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 
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2009).1 Could inequality contribute to other types of organized violence, such as 
vigilantism? 
The next section defines the concept of vigilante organizations, and discusses two 
sub-categories. The third section reviews the literature on vigilantism. The fourth section 
presents the argument. The fifth section discusses vigilantism in Mexico, offering anecdotal 
evidence for the argument. The sixth section introduces original data on vigilante 
organizations in Mexico in 2013, and describes empirical tests. Results suggest municipal-
level income inequality is robustly associated with vigilantism. Other factors such as crime 
rates, government capacity, and indigenous population are not as consistently related to 
organized vigilantism.  
 
II. What are vigilante organizations? 
There are a range of types of vigilante actors, which can be characterized by the 
number of persons involved and their level of organization. On one end of the spectrum are 
individual vigilantes. Further along on the spectrum are relatively hastily-organized groups, 
such as lynch mobs or crowds that assemble for one act of street justice. Next along the 
spectrum are vigilante organizations, collectives of individuals more persistent and 
structured than mobs. These groups are the focus of the present study.  
It is difficult to know for certain, but some scholars argue that organized vigilantism 
is more common than individual vigilantism (Burrows, 1976, p. 274; Abrahams, 1987, p. 
179). Regarding vigilante mobs, scholars have sought to understand this type of behavior, 
which continues to occur throughout the world (Handy, 2004; Godoy, 2006). However, 
mass and relatively random violence likely has some different causes and consequences 
																																																						
1 There are some exception, such as Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug (2013). 
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than more organized and sustained vigilante behavior – the actions of what this article 
refers to as vigilante organizations. 
I define vigilante organizations as sustained associations of private citizens 
voluntarily seeking to illegally control crime or other social infractions in a planned, 
premeditated way, involving force or the threat of force.2 The inclusion of  “sustained,” as 
well as “planned” and “premeditated,” in this definition seeks to distinguish relatively 
formal organizations from random mobs. Formal organizations tend to have names and a 
definable membership (Wilson, 1973, p. 31), and these might be additional ways to 
demarcate these types of groups. This separation is useful because, as noted above, it is 
likely that very different factors explain one afternoon of street violence as opposed to a 
systematic campaign waged by a named group. 
Within the category of vigilante organizations, there are further distinctions that can 
be made. Reviewing the literature, there are two basic ideal-types of vigilante organizations 
that appear: grassroots community groups, and patron-funded groups. In reality, some 
groups are hybrids between these varieties. For example, some groups led by land-owning 
ranchers in Michoacán, as discussed below, also had community support and received 
donations. However, these two sub-categories are ideal types that can be used to illustrate 
funding mechanisms and other dynamics.  
Grassroots community groups might essentially be self-funded, or receive donations 
from their neighbors. Members probably carry their personal weapons, and patrol in their 
free time. This was the case with some groups in recent years in southern Mexico, in areas 
																																																						
2 This definition is an effort to craft a succinct definition from the features Johnston (1996) 
mentions as necessary for a criminological definition of vigilantism. I add “sustained” to 
disqualify spontaneous groups engaging in one act, and also add “illegally” because I 
consider legal and non-legal measures conceptually distinct.  
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such as Guerrero (Fausset, 2014; Macías, 2014). Some groups in Mexico have received 
donations from migrants in the United States (Yagoub, 2014), probably former community 
members, and this would be consistent with the group type. Grassroots community 
vigilante organizations, in various forms, have appeared in many contexts. The Sungusungu 
in Tanzania, formed to combat cattle theft, received donations from their neighbors 
(Abraham, 1987, p. 182). In South Africa, the group People Against Drugs and 
Gangsterism started in 1996 as a grassroots vigilante group, although its motives and 
membership changed with time. 
Patron-funded groups, as the name implies, have another source of support. This 
could be fairly benign, such as a community-oriented group with a sponsor who is 
concerned about the community and asks no favors in return. However, what seems to be 
more common are patron-funded groups that exist primarily to protect the patron’s business 
interests, potentially including workers – instead of an entire community at large.3 This 
suggests patron-funded vigilantes differ from strictly grassroots community groups in terms 
of their loyalty and goals. Examples include the various autodefensa groups formed in 
Colombia in the 1980s to protect landowners and drug traffickers from guerrillas, as well as 
groups organized by business owners in the Mexican city of Juárez more recently. Some 
groups organized by Michoacán ranchers arguably belong in this category as well. In 
Honduras, business leaders have been accused of hiring former security personnel for 
																																																						
3 Some readers might think of these groups as militias, as militias often involve some form 
of patronage system. However, theoretical and popular work on vigilante groups includes 
both grassroots community types groups and patron-funded groups as “vigilante groups.” 
The important commonality they share is the primary motive of illegally substituting for the 
state to provide security from (other) criminals. Regarding militias, the literature tends to 
define these groups broadly: armed, organized groups that are not a part of the state security 
forces (Carey et al., 2013). Technically, all vigilante organizations meet this definition of 
militia. See also Schuberth (2015). 
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vigilante justice (U.S. Department of State, 2005), which is consistent with the idea of 
patron-funded vigilantism. In Nigeria, the Bakassi Boys at least started out as this type of 
group, since business owners supported them financially (Ibrahim, 2005).4 Overall, 
vigilante organizations are an important type of actor, and two important sub-types are the 
grassroots community group and the patron-funded group.  
 
III. What explains vigilantism? 
The most common explanation for vigilantism is weak government in the face of 
crime.5 Baker (2004, p. 167) summarizes the argument, for at least one region: “Together, 
the perceptions of failing state police and rising crime have created a situation today where 
a plethora of non-state policing groups has emerged across [Africa].” The same arguments 
have been used to explain vigilance committees of the 19th century U.S. West (Arellano, 
2012). Some analysts suggest these factors explain vigilantism in Mexico as well 
(Martínez, 2013). Mexico certainly has challenges regarding its criminal justice institutions 
(Uildriks and Tello Peón, 2010). Research suggests that Mexicans are more likely to 
express support for vigilantism if they do not trust local government institutions (Rojo 
Mendoza, 2015). However, supporting the idea of vigilantism is not the same as taking up 
arms. Furthermore, descriptive data on Mexico suggest that vigilante organizations did not 
form in the municipalities with the weakest governments, or the highest crime rates. 
Similarly, in many countries with relatively fragile institutions, vigilantism has not emerged 
in the areas with the highest crime (Ungar, 2007, p. 24; Godoy, 2006, p. 18).  
																																																						
4 The group eventually was funded by state governments, which raises questions about its 
status as a vigilante group. 
5 Crime and government weakness, or at least perceptions thereof, are not independent. For 
example, crime victimization seems to lead to less faith in the government (Carreras, 2013). 
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 An additional explanation for vigilantism is cultural. Handy (2004, 560) argues that 
lynchings in Guatemala are a response to an “alien” judicial system forced upon indigenous 
people. Some scholars studying vigilantism in Africa suggest that it is a return to 
indigenous customs (Gore and Pratten, 2003; Omeje, 2005). Omeje, discussing vigilantes in 
Nigeria, argues that colonial powers, and later Western countries, had imposed notions of 
governance and security “diametrically opposed” to traditional views (Omeje, 2005, pp. 72-
74). As a reaction, citizens formed vigilante groups. If cultural or indigenous explanations 
applied to Mexico, we might expect to see vigilantism mostly in areas with high 
percentages of indigenous citizens, but this does not appear to be the case. 
 Another set of studies emphasizes how civil wars can shape vigilante behavior. 
Bateson’s (2013) work is innovative for considering how past civil war dynamics explain 
variation in vigilantism. Bateson argues that violence in the Guatemalan civil war that 
ended in 1996, among other factors, shapes how Guatemalans would later respond to 
insecurity.6 Quantitative tests suggest that a locality’s history of wartime violence is 
associated with vigilantism. The study considers alternative explanations, including 
inequality, which is not related to vigilantism in the Guatemalan case. Other research looks 
at vigilantism during civil war. Studies of autodefensas in Colombia explain how these 
groups formed during civil war as a way for landowners and other elites to protect their 
property from insurgents (e.g., Romero, 2003). Kowalewski’s (1990) research on the anti-
Maoist “vigilante counterinsurgency” in the Philippines showed that these groups often 
																																																						
6 Bateson (2013) does not argue that civil war is a necessary condition for vigilantism. 
Although her theory’s causal mechanisms are explained in terms of civil war and wartime 
violence (pp. 19-20), it is also argued that the theory can be applied to non-post-conflict 
settings (p. 291). The three ways wartime experiences affects vigilantism are via affecting 
threat perceptions, strategic understandings of violence and punishment, and institutional 
legacies. 
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violated human rights. These civil war cases involve decades of political violence, and 
models explaining vigilantism in these contexts might need to be adjusted to explain 
vigilantism in the face of criminal violence, such as that which has occurred in Mexico.7  
 An alternate and less common set of explanations involves economic inequality, and 
related concepts such as neoliberalism and globalization (Pratten and Sen, 2008). Analysis 
of the Mexican case argues that increased free trade in the 1990s adversely affected many 
communities, which in turn led to increased vigilantism (Fuentes Díaz and Paleta Pérez, 
2015, pp. 174-175). Regarding inequality in particular, a study of vigilantism and other 
private security in Latin America argues that inequality is one explanatory factor among 
several (Ungar, 2007). Research on Nigerian vigilantes suggests that inequality is part of 
the causal story in that country, but in a highly contextualized manner (Smith, 2004). 
University students in secret societies were suspected of perpetrating crimes, so people 
from lower classes formed vigilante groups in part to respond to these crimes of the elite. In 
a different context, Godoy (2006) blames neoliberalism, along with decades of state 
violence, for the increase in lynchings in Guatemala since the 1990s. A common theme in 
this work is that neoliberalism and inequality matter because they have affected justice, or 
perceptions of justice, in important ways. 
These arguments involving inequality raise a number of questions. Is it only the 
broad phenomenon of neoliberalism that leads to organized vigilantism, or does economic 
inequality in particular play a direct role? To what extent does the effect of inequality 
depend on unique local factors, such as university student crimes (in the Nigerian case 
above) or recent state violence (in Guatemala)? Is there a more general relationship 
																																																						
7 On similarities and differences between political and criminal violence, see Kalyvas 
(2015) and Phillips (2015). 
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between inequality and vigilantism? In the next section I build on this work to argue that 
local economic inequality contributes to the emergence of vigilante organizations. 
 
IV. Economic inequality, security inequality, and organized vigilantism 
Vigilante organizations are heterogeneous; there are many reasons they form. 
However, economic inequality seems to contribute to the formation of vigilante 
organizations through two complimentary mechanisms. The overarching idea is that 
economic inequality leads to security inequality. 
 
Inequality and the relative deprivation of security 
Around the world, wealthier citizens often seek out additional security, beyond that 
which is provided by the government to the typical person. As the security of the wealthy 
increases, poorer citizens are likely to feel relatively insecure. In economically unequal 
areas, regarding security, there is an issue of relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970). The notion 
that local inequality can uniquely heighten tensions, as citizens are more aware of the other 
group, is consistent with survey data. For example, in situations of high inequality, 
wealthier citizens are especially likely to believe in meritocracy, while poorer citizens are 
especially unlikely to believe in it. This difference does not occur in localities that are 
relatively equal (Newman et al., 2015). In areas with substantial security inequality, the 
feeling of relative insecurity or deprivation could encourage poorer citizens to form 
vigilante organizations.  
Security inequality can stem from the use of private security, and also issues related 
to public security. Regarding private security, citizens who can afford to do so use a 
number of anti-crime measures. Private guards protect many apartment buildings, gated 
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communities, and places of work, among other locations. Guatemala, for example, has 
about 20,000 police officers, but “120,000 private guards watch over those who can afford 
to hire them.” (United Nations Development Program, 2013). Interestingly, some of the 
countries with the highest inequality levels are also the countries with the highest 
saturations of private security firms.8  
Private security is increasingly used for a variety of reasons. Investments in private 
security are sometimes related to spikes in crime, but often not. For example, in the United 
States, private security spending increased substantially in the 1990s, even as crime was 
decreasing (Dempsey, 2008, p. 15). A more common explanation for increased use of 
private security in recent decades is the privatization revolution, the trend toward 
denationalization of state services (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011). The new status quo is 
“post-Keynesian policing” (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996), so citizens with the means to do 
so continually improve their security. 
Poorer citizens are less likely to benefit from the use of private security. Analysis of 
Latin America by the Associated Press (2014) draws this conclusion: “The guards-for-hire 
offer protection to the wealthy and middle-classes… Poorer residents get by however they 
can: forming vigilante groups or paying thugs to leave them alone” (emphasis added). A 
study of Brazil, which mentions vigilante organizations, argues that vigilantes “may be the 
only type of private security available to the poor” (Caldeira, 2000, p. 206). This is 
consistent with the idea of grassroots community vigilante organizations.9 
																																																						
8 See the appendix. 
9 Some readers might think that poorer citizens do not need private security, since they are 
less likely to have expensive possessions that would make them targets for thieves. 
However, vigilantism is a response to many types of crimes, including suspected rape, 
livestock, and illegal logging. 
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Increased use of private security by the wealthy could encourage the government to 
shift public security services toward the relatively insecure citizens, those with lower 
incomes.10 This would mitigate security inequality. However, there is not much evidence of 
this occurring. Higher-income citizens generally have disproportionate access to public 
security institutions, as is discussed below, but do not seem to be willing to give this up 
because of advantages with private security. According to one argument in the human 
rights literature, “there are incentives for the ‘haves’ in society to engage in rent-seeking 
behavior within governmental institutions, to maintain control of their resources, and to 
exclude access to those resources by the ‘have nots’… (Landman and Larizza, 2009).” 
Business groups in Central America, relying on private security, lobbied against security 
taxes, and their use of private security was argued to be an important factor in this 
preference.11 
Public security, the responsibility of the police and the judiciary, also is likely to be 
more unequal in situations of economic inequality. Independently of state capacity, the 
willingness of state actors to provide quality services can vary substantially. Abrahamsen 
and Williams (2011, 65) argue that privatization of public security has not necessarily led 
to less state ability, but “priorities have shifted,” with police forces often used for “private 
political purposes.” Given some degree of informality, and finite public resources, 
government agents can choose to provide better services – or services at all – to certain 
citizens. Security services are likely to go to those with disproportionate influence over the 
																																																						
10 I thank a reviewer for pointing out this possibility. 
11Regarding this case, the wealthy “don’t get security from the state, and therefore are not 
willing to pay taxes,” argues one analyst, who previously was Costa Rica’s planning and 
economic policy minister (Walter, 2011). 
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system, as well as those able to pay bribes or otherwise subsidize services.12 This leads to 
inequality in justice, and participants in vigilante groups often list lack of access to the 
criminal justice system as an important motivation (Chouza, 2014). 
Evidence of the importance of state agent discretion in explaining vigilantism 
occurs in a number of contexts. Regarding the formation of citizen militias in Cameroon, 
“the ill-will of the government on the provision of security” is cited as an important factor 
(Banseka, 2005). Interview evidence from Bolivia suggests that law enforcement discretion 
tends to favor wealthier residents – which in turn is offered as a justification for 
vigilantism. “Many people claimed that only the rich or the middle class get police 
attention, because they are the only ones who can afford it,” summarize the study’s authors 
(Goldstein et al., 2007, p. 53, emphasis added). In situations of greater economic inequality, 
the disparity in security – private or public – is especially acute. Given the lack of means 
for poorer citizens to acquire (legal) private security, and relatively little attention from 
state security services, poorer citizens in this situation seem prone to organize their own 
security.  
 
Inequality and patron-funded vigilantism 
																																																						
12	It might be argued that wealthy people, particularly in developing countries, do not 
necessarily want police protection. They seem to prefer private security. However, there are 
still reasons why wealthier citizens might “siphon off” public security, contributing to 
security inequality. First, public security is not only policing, but also prosecution. There is 
evidence that crimes victimizing wealthy citizens are more likely to be prosecuted 
(McDonald, 1977, p. 300; Reames, 2007, p. 77). Second, citizens with disproportionate 
access to public security services, including through bribes, are also protected from the 
police. In many countries such as Mexico, police demand protection money, and those who 
do not pay might face consequences.	
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The second reason that economic inequality can lead to organized vigilantism is 
because inequality indicates a distribution of labor that mitigates collective action problems 
for forming self-defense groups. In a locality with relatively equal wealth distribution, it 
might be challenging to get a group of citizens to take the law into their own hands. Who 
would lead? Who would provide funding? Which residents would engage in the dirty work 
of actual violence?  
When wealth is concentrated in the hands of the few, a structure is present that can 
be exploited for organized vigilantism. Relatively wealthy residents could act as patrons, 
and fund a group of poorer residents as an informal private security force. These are the 
patron-funded groups described previously. This dynamic has played out in various places 
throughout the world as business owners fund lower-income residents, perhaps their own 
employees, to take up arms as vigilantes.    
This is precisely how some autodefensa groups started in Colombia in the 1980s. 
After a wave of kidnappings and extortion, wealthy citizens including drug traffickers and 
cattle ranchers created groups to take the law into their own hands. (e.g., Human Rights 
Watch, 1996).13 In Nigeria, traders’ associations founded and funded the famous vigilante 
group the Bakassi Boys to deter armed robberies (Ibrahim, 2005). In Mexico, business 
owners in Ciudad Juárez funded some vigilante groups (Petrich, 2011, Washington Valdez 
2011). In rural areas of Mexico, ranchers funded and led vigilante groups (Milenio, 2014). 
This is discussed more below. Overall, the combination of relatively wealthy patrons and a 
corps of workers willing to protect them seems to be an environment conducive to the 
																																																						
13 Some of these groups eventually became, or originally were, pro-state paramilitaries, 
challenging the power of leftist groups as “social control” vigilantes (Rosenbaum and 
Sederberg, 1970). However, at least initially, some of the groups were more traditional 
vigilante groups, primarily focused on confronting kidnappers and extortionists. 
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formation of vigilante groups. This combination is more likely to exist in areas with greater 
inequality. 
This mechanism is about the opportunity structure that inequality can provide. 
Prominent studies have described inequality as only a grievance, and therefore not a 
condition that on its own makes organizing violence feasible (Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 
2009). Organizing violence, getting individuals to engage in illegal and dangerous 
behavior, represents a substantial collective action problem (Lichbach, 1995). However, 
since this mechanism is specifically about feasibility or opportunity, it suggests inequality 
can contribute to organized violence in ways beyond the traditional grievance pathway. 
Overall, there are a variety of types of vigilante organizations, and inequality seems 
to contribute to more grassroots community vigilantism (the first mechanism), as well as 
patron-funded vigilantism (the second mechanism). As a result of these two causal 
pathways, citizens in situations of economic inequality should be more likely to take up 
arms against criminals. This is the basic hypothesis of this study: local economic inequality 
is positively associated with the presence of vigilante organizations. 
 
V. Vigilantism in Mexico 
 Vigilantism has a long history in Mexico (Kitchens, 1967). There is also a history of 
legal community defense, particularly in indigenous communities, which sometimes 
practice self-governance through the usos y costumbres framework. In the 1990s, 
community police organizations formed in Guerrero, but these groups are different from the 
vigilantes of 2013, and vigilantes generally, due to their legality (Salgado, 2013). Other 
legal security collectives include neighborhood watch associations (Vilalta, 2013), which 
usually report suspected criminals to the police instead of using force against them. 
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Mexico, like other countries, has also seen lynchings and similar vigilantism. In Mexico 
City there were five acts of violent street justice reported in 2013, and several more in 2014 
(Fuentes, 2014). 
 Throughout the country, groups of citizens have taken the law into their own hands 
to bring “justice” to perceived criminals. One expert argues that such acts have increased 
since the year 2000 (Grillo, 2009). Vigilantism in Mexico during these years has often been 
unorganized – mob violence, or carried out by friends and families of a victim. However, 
with the start of Mexico’s militarized “war” against drugs in 2006, a few vigilante 
organizations began to appear in various corners of the country. As most of the violence in 
those years was in the north of the country, that is where some of the first vigilante groups 
emerged. Violence spread throughout the country in the years that followed, and to some 
degree vigilantism spread with it. 
 In 2008 in the border city of Ciudad Juárez, a group called the Citizen Front Against 
Corruption and Violence announced its presence, and was possibly responsible for the 
deaths of drug dealers and corrupt police officers (Cano, 2009). In 2011 in the town of 
Cherán, Michoacán, residents attacked illegal loggers connected to drug-traffickers – and 
forced out the local police – in a bold uprising that foreshadowed events of 2013 (Martínez 
Elorriaga, 2011). These acts, however, were isolated. Overall, since the 2006 start of 
Mexico’s militarized confrontation with criminal groups, vigilantism rarely occurred 
against these groups.14 One expert suggested, “it is ironic that vigilante acts do not appear 
to be increasing amid the atmosphere of violence afflicting Mexico” (Grayson, 2011).  
																																																						
14 There were other citizen responses to violence in these years, such as social movements 
and protests (e.g., Gallagher 2012), but usually the intended audience was the national 
government. 
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 This changed in 2013. In January, many communities in Mexico apparently reached 
a tipping point, and vigilante organizations sprung up almost overnight. One important 
event was in Ayutla, Guerrero, in southern Mexico, where a criminal gang kidnapped a 
community delegate. Residents armed with guns and machetes freed the delegate 
(International Crisis Group, 2013). This inspired people in nearby municipalities to take up 
arms and hold demonstrations, and these actions were broadcast widely through the news 
media (e.g., Casey, 2013). Other groups formed in the neighboring state of Michoacán, and 
across the country. In February, for example, a vigilante group had formed in Mexico State, 
just outside Mexico City (Montaño, 2013). By fall of 2013, the National Human Rights 
Commission acknowledged that vigilante organizations had formed in at least 10 states 
(Alcántara, 2013).  
There seems to have been important diffusion effects in the emergence of vigilante 
organizations in Mexico in 2013. The news media apparently played a critical role, as 
citizens learned about vigilante actions elsewhere in the country, and were inspired to start 
their own group. The role of the news media in social movement diffusion has been 
observed in other contexts (Kern, 2011). Occasionally groups in Michoacán spread when 
vigilantes from one town would help “liberate” a neighboring town, forcing out organized 
crime so that a local vigilante organization could control the town (La Jornada, 2013). A 
more common way vigilantism traveled spatially was through learning and interpersonal 
communication. For example, the citizens of La Ruana, Michoacán formed the state’s first 
vigilante organization on Feb. 24, 2013, and soon after groups formed in the neighboring 
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towns, Buenavista and Tepalcatepec (Mayorga, 2014).15 This was apparently neighbor 
emulation diffusion (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006). 
Actions by vigilante organizations varied considerably. In many cases they 
protested at government buildings (Cabrera, 2013), or patrolled their neighborhood in a 
show of force (Martínez Elorriaga & Ocampo Arista, 2013). They set up roadblocks, to try 
to catch members of criminal organizations (Gil Olmos, 2013). In some instances vigilante 
groups detained suspected criminals, conducting their own trials (Covarrubias & Cervantes, 
2013). Sometimes they killed suspected criminals (Covarrubias, 2013). In the state of 
Michoacán, they at times engaged in firefights with organized crime groups over control of 
particular towns (Carrión Enviada, 2014). In a few cases, vigilante organizations stormed 
local city halls and “arrested” the local police forces they considered corrupt (García 
Davish, 2014).  
The situation apparently peaked in January 2014. Vigilantes had been losing public 
support, as reports appeared that some vigilantes were extorting their fellow citizens 
(Becerra Acosta, 2014). Some of the groups had evidently been corrupted, and were being 
armed by one criminal group to fight another (Mercado, 2014). As violence increased in 
Michoacán in particular, the Mexican government deployed the military, taking over the 
security of the state. At the end of the month, the government legalized some of the 
apparently un-corrupted vigilante organizations. These groups registered their weapons, 
among other steps, and were christened the Rural Defense Force. By early February, the 
force had 500 members (Muédano, 2014). While some vigilante organizations continue to 
exist in various parts of the country, the uprising that started in early 2013 had mostly 
ended a year later. 
																																																						
15 For in-depth analysis of vigilantes in Tepalcatepec, Michoacán, see Guerra (2016). 
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Inequality and organized vigilantism in the Mexican case 
  There have been diverse explanations offered for why Mexican vigilante 
organizations formed in 2013. Many press accounts simply say the citizens were “fed up 
with crime” (Calderón, 2014). Other accounts emphasize another traditional explanation for 
vigilantism – the inability of the state to stop crime, and more broadly protect the rights of 
all citizens (Zurita Eraña, 2014). For example, one Mexican analyst argues that the cause of 
vigilantism is nothing new in the country: it is related to the “absence or inefficiency of a 
state function: public security provision” (El Universal, 2013). Perceptions of injustice 
were widespread, and vigilantes were seen as one response to this problem. This 
explanation, however, does not indicate why vigilantism did not occur in the most crime-
infested areas, or everywhere – given widespread crime and famously under-resourced 
municipal police. 
 Inequality helps explain why vigilante organizations emerged in some areas instead 
of others. Regarding the mechanism about economic inequality leading to security 
inequality, and poorer citizens forming groups for their own defense, we see evidence of 
this in Mexico. The idea of security inequality might explain why poor Mexicans are more 
likely than wealthier Mexicans to express support for vigilante justice (Zizumbo, 2010). 
Poorer citizens are disadvantaged in terms of private and public security, consistent with 
the argument.  
Wealthier citizens in Mexico are protected by a great deal of private security. As in 
other countries, the use of private security in Mexico surged in the 1990s, but gained 
additional steam when the “drug war” began. Estimates vary, but for example a 40% 
increase in private security spending was reported in 2011 relative to the previous year 
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(SDP Noticias, 2011). Beyond elite services such as bodyguards, private security is 
employed in workplaces, apartment buildings, and private neighborhoods. Mexico has one 
of the highest concentrations of gated communities in the world (Provost, 2014), where the 
inequality between those inside the walls and those outside is stark (Enríquez Acosta, 
2007). Wealthy Mexicans have taken a number of additional measures in the face of rising 
crime. “The upper middle class and the rich are turning to bulletproofing their cars,” reports 
one news story, also describing a trend of installing GPS trackers in cars, and the sale of 
expensive bulletproof clothing (Iliff, 2008). Wealthy citizens apparently had many options 
able to be relatively safe from the violence in the country. 
 Beyond private security leaving poorer citizens to their own defenses, intentional 
choices of public security officials also seem to play a role in the Mexican case. Consistent 
with this article’s argument, anecdotal evidence suggests that the government is seen as 
intentionally abandoning citizens, at least poorer citizens. Dr. José Manuel Mireles, the 
well-known leader of a vigilante group in Tepalcatepec, Michoacán, said his group had 
only two demands: “public security and access to the administration of justice” (Chouza, 
2014). The concern about “access” is consistent with the notion of some citizens feeling left 
out of the process. Another group leader from Michoacán makes a similar argument. “This 
is a poor people’s movement… We are abandoned, for the state it is as if we do not exist” 
(Prados, 2013, emphasis added).  
Government officials have also acknowledged that the state has not been providing 
the security that it should. In 2013, the president of Mexico’s National Human Rights 
Commission said that the appearance of vigilantes was a warning sign for authorities “to 
fulfill their obligation to provide public security” (Gandaria, 2013). He further said that in 
various parts of the country, the situation was ripe for self-defense groups because of 
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“abandonment and impunity” (ibid.). Some of the issues of injustice in Mexico, such as the 
only 2 percent sentencing rate for homicides in recent years (Pachico, 2013), are at least in 
part due to lack of capacity. However, corruption plays a substantial role as well. Mexican 
security expert Raúl Benitez, for example, argues that a war against crime will not succeed 
without a “war against corruption” (Prados, 2013). 
It was suggested in the argument that wealthier citizens have privileged access to 
public services, including security, through various means. Regarding corruption, and 
bribery in particular, there is substantial evidence of this behavior in Mexico (Transparency 
International, 2013). Given the extensive nature of corruption in Mexico, areas with more 
economic inequality should see public security services going to citizens with more money. 
This is consistent with vigilante groups demanding an end to corruption (Covarrubias, 
2013b), and various analyses that suggest the groups emerged at least partly because of 
corruption (Egui Brito, 2014). This disparity in public security provision, along with 
unequal access to private security, should increase the likelihood of citizens turning to 
organized vigilantism.  
Regarding the mechanism where unequal income distribution makes it possible for 
relatively wealthy citizens to organize vigilante groups, this has occurred in a number of 
instances. In the state of Michoacán, local ranchers supported or even led some vigilante 
groups. A prominent example is lemon grower and rancher Hipólito Mora, who founded 
and led a group in that state (Milenio, 2014). He reportedly owns about 37 acres of lemon 
orchards (Cano, 2014), and other vigilante leaders in Michoacán also own substantial tracts 
of land (Milenio, 2014). In Ciudad Juárez, local business owners funded several groups, as 
discussed. Consistent with the argument that inequality creates an environment where 
business leaders can fund hitmen in vigilante groups, this is exactly what happened in 
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Ciudad Juárez. In the case of the Citizen Command for Juárez, the group was literally 
former hitmen – former Zetas contracted by four local business owners (Ramsey, 2011).16 
Other business owners created the United Junkyard Owners (Petrich, 2011). In sum, we do 
see examples in Mexico of patron-funded vigilante groups. 
Anecdotally, the Mexican case suggests some support for the theorized connections 
between inequality and organized vigilantism. There is evidence for the first mechanism, 
where inequality has led to security inequality – encouraging poorer citizens to take the law 
into their own hands. There is also support for the second mechanism, where wealthy 
patrons fund or lead vigilante groups made up of poorer citizens. This occurred in a variety 
of places in the country. The next section seeks to more systematically analyze the Mexican 
case, taking alternate explanations into consideration. 
 
 
VI. Data and analysis 
  
Analyses are conducted on a cross-section of all Mexican municipalities for which 
there are sufficient data, with dependent variable data from 2013 and independent variable 
data from 2012, or the most recent pre-2013 year possible if no data were available in 2012. 
The primary models include around 2,440 observations, almost all of Mexico’s 
municipalities. Other models have fewer observations because of missing data on variables. 
Logistic regression is used due to the nature of the dependent variable, with robust standard 
errors (Zorn, 2006).  
																																																						
16 Interestingly, this group also reportedly had connections with the Mexican military 
(Petrich, 2011; Ramsey, 2011). This seems comparable to dynamics of the Colombian 
autodefensas. The Juárez group, however, was apparently relatively isolated and short-
lived. 
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The dependent variable is vigilante organization, a dichotomous variable coded “1” 
for those municipalities in which a vigilante organization operated in 2013. To code this 
variable, Mexican media sources were searched, such as the newspapers El Universal and 
Milenio, as well as the website Animal Político. The variable is coded according the 
definition discussed earlier. There are 75 municipalities coded “1” for the variable. Many of 
the groups are located in the south of Mexico, with disproportionate numbers in the states 
of Guerrero (21 municipalities) and Michoacán (18). However, groups are distributed 
throughout the country, in 13 of the 32 federal entities.         
The year 2013 is chosen because that is when a wave a vigilante organizations 
emerged, so they seem relatively comparable – as opposed to vigilante organizations 
founded at various times throughout history. Additionally, since most of the groups were 
founded within one year, causal factors from the previous year can be analyzed to attempt 
to determine why groups formed where and when they did. The collection of the variable 
was also limited to 2013 because the national context changed substantially in early 2014, 
when the government legalized some of the groups. Groups that emerged after this 
legalization might have been motivated by different factors than those pre-legalization.  
Independent variable information is gathered from 2012 or as close to it as possible, 
but not from 2013, to mitigate potential reverse causality issues. The variable inequality is 
used to measure economic inequality in the municipality. It is the Gini coefficient, a 
standard measure of inequality, and comes from the National Council of Evaluation of 
Social Development Policy. It theoretically ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates equality 
and 1 indicates perfect inequality, and in this sample it ranges from .286 to .591. A 
coefficient of .286 is approximately the inequality of Denmark or the Netherlands, while a 
.591 indicates inequality at a level between Honduras and South Africa. A map of the 
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subnational distribution of economic inequality is shown in the appendix. Gini is not 
perfect, but it probably the most widely used measure of economic inequality, and the most 
available subnationally for Mexico. Education inequality is also examined in the empirical 
tests to determine if other types of inequality are associated with vigilantism, or if 
economic inequality in particular is uniquely important. 
To measure prominent alternative explanations, models include various measures of 
crime rates, as well as government capacity. The primary measure of crime is the 2012 
homicide rate. This variable comes from INEGI, and is deaths ruled homicides, per 100,000 
inhabitants. Homicides are used because it is possible that only serious crime such as this 
might inspire citizens to take up arms. More practically, homicide data are much more 
reliable than Mexican data on other crimes. A squared term of the homicide rate is also 
used, to see if a non-linear relationship exists. Another model includes the yearly change in 
the homicide rate from 2011-2012. Another includes the general crime rate. This variable 
uses 2010 crime data, and comes from INEGI. The appendix also shows models with rates 
of drug-related homicides, kidnapping, extortion, and drug-dealing, as well squared terms 
of these variables.   
The primary measure of state capacity is GDP per capita (“producción bruta total” 
divided by population), in thousands of pesos. This is admittedly not an ideal measure, but 
it is used elsewhere as a proxy for government capacity (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). It is used 
here as the primary measure because other measures have substantial missing data. The 
source is INEGI, via the EVES database (Bravo Regidor et al., 2014). The data are from 
2008, but do not change substantially over time. The more substantial variation is across 
municipalities. A model also includes the squared version of GDP per capita, to test a 
possible non-linear relationship.  
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One alternate measure of state capacity is libraries per capita. This measure is 
admittedly not a measure of security or justice capacity, but is a proxy for overall 
government capacity. It has the advantage of being relatively exogenous to security issues. 
Data come from INEGI in 2010. Another state capacity measure is municipal government 
income as a percentage of municipal government spending. This measure is sometimes 
referred to as “fiscal autonomy.” It comes from the National Institute for Federalism and 
Municipal Development, and is from 2011. Only 1,322 municipalities have data for this 
variable, so results should be taken with caution. Squared terms for these variables are 
shown in the appendix. 
To capture another prominent argument in the literature, the cultural and 
particularly indigenous explanation, models include indigenous language, which is the 
percentage of residents of the municipality age 5 years or older that speak an indigenous 
language. This variable comes from the INEGI, and data come from 2010. Another 
measure was tested, percent of land that is communal under the ejido framework, and 
results were similar. 
Beyond the independent variables testing alternative explanations, models include a 
number of control variables. All models include a natural logarithm of municipal 
population. They also include a geographic or diffusion measure, vigilantes in neighbor. 
This variable is coded 1 if there is a vigilante group in one of the municipalities bordering 
the municipality being analyzed. Models also include urban population, a measure of the 
percentage of the population living in urban areas, because organized vigilantism is often a 
rural phenomenon. Data come from INEGI in 2010. Finally, models include a measure of 
the percent of households reporting remittances from the United States. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests at least some of the groups were supported by funds from Mexicans living in the 
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United States. This variable comes from the National Population Council, via the EVES 
database.  
 
   
Results 
 
Results are in Table 1. The first model is the primary model. The main independent 
variable, inequality, is statistically significant and positively signed, suggesting that 
municipalities with more inequality are more likely to have a vigilante organization 
operating in them. This result is robust across all models. The use of marginal effects 
suggest a standard deviation change in income inequality is associated with a 24% increase 
in the probability of a vigilante organization being present in the municipality, other factors 
held constant. This is a more substantial effect than any other variable in the models. As a 
comparison, if a municipality goes from “0” to “1” on the variable vigilantes in neighbor, 
the estimated change in the probability in the municipality having a vigilante organization 
is only a 7% increase. 
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
 
In Model 1, independent variables representing alternative causal explanations are 
statistically insignificant. Neither the 2012 homicide rate nor GDPPC – the measure of state 
capacity – are statistically associated with the presence of a vigilante group.17 This is 
somewhat surprising, and is discussed more below. Regarding other explanations, the 
variable measuring the percent of the population that speaks an indigenous language is 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that “cultural” arguments for vigilantism being 
																																																						
17 If the homicide rate and GDPPC are interacted, and the results graphed, there is never a 
statistically significant relationship with organized vigilantism. 
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rooted in indigenous cultures do not find support in these tests. If an alternative measure is 
used, the percent of land that is communal land under the ejido framework, the variable 
remains statistically insignificant and other results are unaffected.  
Model 2 includes squared terms of both the homicide rate and per capita income, to 
see if there are nonlinear relationships between these variables and vigilantism. 
Interestingly, both the homicide measure and its squared term are statistically significant, 
and jointly suggest that homicide is associated with organized vigilantism at moderate 
levels of the homicide rate. In other words, there is an inverted-U relationship between 
homicide and vigilantism. This could be because some level of serious crime is necessary 
to inspire vigilantism, but if violent crime levels become too high, it is too dangerous for 
vigilantes to operate. This provides some support for the notion that violent crime is related 
to vigilantism. The insignificance of the GDPPC measure and its square term in Model 2 
suggests there is no support for the idea of an inverted-U relationship between state 
capacity and vigilantism in this model. In the appendix, a few of the alternate measures of 
crime and state capacity show non-linear relationships with vigilantism, but there is not 
consistent support for this type of relationship. The appendix results are discussed more 
below.  
Models 3-6 include alternate measures of crime (change in the homicide rate, and 
general crime rate) and state capacity (libraries per capita and fiscal autonomy). None of 
the alternate measures is statistically associated with organized vigilantism.  
Regarding other variables, population is statistically significant and positive, 
suggesting municipalities with larger populations are more likely to see a vigilante 
organization emerge. Vigilantes in neighbor is consistently statistically significant and 
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positive, suggesting municipalities in such a condition are more likely to have vigilante 
organizations. This is consistent with qualitative evidence of diffusion.  
Urban population is negatively signed, as expected, never statistically significant. 
Migrant remittances is positively signed as expected, but is only marginally statistically 
significant (p<.10) in one model. Anecdotal evidence suggests migrants in the United 
States sent funding to some vigilante groups, but this might not have been a widespread 
phenomenon. 
 
Additional models in the appendix 
The appendix shows additional tests. Models show squared terms of crime and state 
capacity measures used in the main results table. None are statistically significant, except 
fiscal autonomy and its squared term. However, the results are counterintuitive – they 
suggest vigilantism is less likely at low levels of state capacity, but the effect diminishes as 
capacity increases. The fiscal autonomy measure is missing data on almost half the 
observations, so this result should be taken with considerable caution.  
Regarding alternate measures of crime, the appendix tests five measures of crime, 
and two (a drug-related homicide variable and extortion) suggest a non-linear relationship 
between the type of crime and vigilantism.18 This adds some evidence to the notion, shown 
with homicide rates in Model 2, that crime affects vigilantism, but that this effect 
diminishes as crime increases beyond a certain point. 
Two appendix models explore whether the conviction rate in a municipality is 
associated with vigilantism. Low conviction rates could be an indicator of injustice, and 
impunity in particular, which has been cited as a grievance among vigilantes. However, 
																																																						
18 The extortion measure is only marginally statistically significant. 
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neither measure is statistically associated with vigilantism. Another model includes 
measures of which drug-trafficking organization had been operating in the municipality, 
because of the possibility that vigilantism is a response to certain types of groups. The only 
variable statistically associated with organized vigilantism is the measure of the Juarez 
Cartel. However, it is marginally significant, and the substantive significance is low. It does 
not seem that the actions of one particular group contribute much to explaining organized 
vigilantism in general. 
A measure of a different type of inequality, education inequality, is also tested in the 
appendix. Education inequality is measured by, for each municipality, the ratio of the 
number of residents with a post-graduate degree to the number of residents who cannot read 
or write. The argument of this article was about economic inequality, so education 
inequality should not necessarily be related to vigilantism. Indeed, the coefficient on 
education inequality is statistically insignificant. This suggests that it is not inequality 
generally, or other types of inequality, that are associated with vigilantism. As other 
research has shown, different types of inequality have divergent consequences. In this 
manuscript was theorized that economic inequality is related to security inequality, and the 
lack of relationship found for education inequality is consistent with this. 
Finally, an appendix model excludes municipalities in the state of Guerrero. This is 
because Guerrero has a considerable history of legal community policing, and this could be 
affecting results. However, even with Guerrero excluded, results from Model 1 do not 
substantially change. Overall, the results for economic inequality are highly robust to many 




The lack of statistically significant relationships between organized vigilantism and 
many crime measures or state capacity measures is somewhat surprising. On the one hand, 
other studies have shown that vigilantism often does not appear in the areas with the 
highest crime or weakest government. On the other hand, it is likely that vigilantism would 
not have emerged in 2013 if crime levels were low and security institutions capable. So 
why is there a disparity between this conventional wisdom and the empirical results?  
 Regarding crime, the finding of an inverted-U relationship between some crime 
measures and vigilantism helps us to understand the role of crime in community self-
defense. The lack of results for other crime variables should not be interpreted as an 
indication that crime plays no role in the emergence of vigilantism. The widespread nature 
of criminal violence in Mexico since 2006 (like the pervasive weak security institutions) 
might make specific municipal levels less relevant. It can also be, as has been argued, that 
vigilantism has diverse causes and types. In some towns, vigilantism was a response to 
murder, but in others it was a response to kidnapping. As a result, measures of either type 
of crime are unlikely to show a general effect.  
Regarding state capacity, weak security institutions are endemic in Mexico, so 
perhaps subnational variation in state capacity is not meaningful for explaining vigilantism. 
A certain level of state weakness seems necessary for vigilantism, and it could be that most 
Mexican municipalities meet the criterion. This is likely the case for many developing 
countries. Another possibility is that there is within-municipality variation that is difficult 
to measure – vigilantism might have emerged in a municipality with “average” state 
capacity, but perhaps in part of the municipality with the least attention from the 
government. Future research could look into smaller units, such as grid squares, to explore 
within-municipality variation. 
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One limitation of the empirical tests is the lack of time dynamics in the models. 
Regarding diffusion, the best way to demonstrate spatial diffusion is using time-series data. 
In order to show spatial effects, as opposed to some common underlying phenomenon, the 
spatial variable (Vigilantes in neighbor) should ideally be temporally lagged (Franzese and 
Hays, 2008, p. 758). The primary focus of this article is inequality, not diffusion, but a 
more fine-grained look at the diffusion of vigilantism would make for important future 
research.  
Due to the lack of time-varying data, the data is not able to answer other questions 
about timing, such as why vigilantism emerged in 2013 more than other years. As 
discussed in the qualitative analysis, there seem to have been a tipping point and diffusion 
effects, at least partly related to the geography of crime in Mexico. When crime initially 
increased in northern Mexico, where inequality is relatively low, there was not much 
vigilantism. However, as crime spread several years later to southern Mexico, which is 
more unequal, vigilantism appeared substantially. Vigilantism occurred in other parts of the 
country as well, but generally in area with high levels of inequality. Beyond the possibility 
of changes in crime (which did not find much support in empirical tests), another potential 
factor is the change in Mexico’s president in 2012. Perhaps public doubts about changes in 
federal security policy contributed to the likelihood of vigilantism at that time. 
Are the findings from this study applicable to other countries? Mexico has a fairly 
weak institutions, and has been experiencing relatively high levels of crime. These could be 
scope conditions for other areas to which generalizations could be made. In other countries 
with these conditions – many developing countries – we might also see inequality leading 
to organized vigilantism. Indeed, examples mentioned previously showed the theorized 
causal mechanisms at work in Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and South Africa. Not 
	 32 
coincidentally, I would argue, these countries also score high in terms of economic 
inequality. There are also local factors that contribute to and condition causal factors such 
as inequality. In the Mexico case, the war on drugs was obviously important. However, this 
can be seen as an example of a more general phenomenon, a crime wave. Overall, Mexico, 
as a developing country experiencing higher crime levels than it had been, is comparable to 
many other countries.  
A related question is why Mexico had so many vigilante organizations, while at 
least some of the other countries mentioned above apparently have had fewer. A number of 
local-context issues in Mexico could explain this. The tradition of community policing in 
some parts of the country is likely to have played a role, although vigilantes also emerged 
in many areas without such traditions. The widespread nature of organized vigilantism 
could also have been related to qualitative differences in criminal violence, with violence in 
Mexico sometimes involving terrorist tactics. This could have been especially shocking to 
citizens. So Mexico is an extreme case in some senses, but we could still expect the 
theoretical mechanisms to function in other countries, perhaps with a less severe outcome 
in terms of the number of groups.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
Throughout the world, vigilantism occurs when citizens decide to administer justice 
themselves instead of depending on police and courts. Vigilantism is often an indicator of 
serious governance problems, and it can have deleterious consequences. Vigilante 
organizations, as opposed to individuals or random mobs, suggest deep-rooted challenges 
to traditional authority. In spite of the importance of this phenomenon, there is little 
research on why vigilante organizations form.  
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This article presented an argument for why local economic inequality is likely to be 
related to organized vigilantism. This occurs through two mechanisms, leading to the two 
ideal-types of vigilante groups, grassroots community organizations and patron-funded 
groups, respectively. The argument finds some support in anecdotal evidence from the 
recent uprising of vigilante groups in Mexico. Examples of the causal mechanisms are also 
apparent in some other countries as well. Regarding more systematic empirical evidence, 
quantitative analyses of Mexico’s more than 2,000 municipalities showed that income 
inequality is robustly associated with municipalities with a vigilante organization.  
The analyses did not find much support for competing explanations, such as high 
crime, low state capacity, or indigenous population. The one exception is that there seems 
to be an inverted-U relationship between some crimes and organized vigilantism. 
Vigilantism emerged in areas with moderate levels of crime, but this effect disappears at 
higher levels of crime.  
It should be acknowledged that inequality on its own is probably insufficient to 
explain vigilantism. Mexico’s self-defense groups would not have emerged if crime were 
not an issue, or if the government were fully capable and willing to protect citizens. 
Common quantitative measures did not consistently show associations between crime and 
vigilantism, or state capacity and vigilantism. However, in Mexico – like in many 
developing countries – crime is widespread and local authorities are under-equipped. One 
way to interpret the findings of this study would be that assuming some degree of crime 
and state weakness, economic inequality increases the likelihood of vigilantism. Therefore 
it is likely that inequality should play a role in vigilantism in countries beyond Mexico. 
 A number of questions remain. First, as discussed, the present study did not seek to 
explain the timing of vigilantism, why vigilante organizations appeared across Mexico in 
	 34 
2013 as opposed to other years. Future research should investigate this temporal question, 
but time-series data would be needed. Additionally, while there seems to be a relationship 
between inequality and vigilantism in this particular case, does the same relationship occur 
in other countries subnationally, or cross-nationally? A glance at income inequality data 
suggests that some of the countries with the highest Gini coefficients are also known for 
vigilantism, but this is worth additional investigation. A related question is whether 
inequality explains individual or lynch-mob vigilantism. This is possible through the causal 
mechanism of security inequality and relative deprivation, but should be studied further. 
The second mechanism is unlikely to explain individual vigilantism, as it deals with 
organizing a group.  
Finally, it was noted that inequality has been dismissed by many scholars of civil 
conflict as only a grievance factor that is unable to explain conflict on its own. If inequality 
helps organize vigilante groups, under what conditions might inequality contribute to other 
types of violence, including militia violence? Subnational or even group-level studies might 
be ideal to address this type of question. 
  Scholars have long studied inequality. Vigilantism, on the other hand, has been 
under-analyzed in political science, although that seems to be changing in recent years 
(e.g., Bateson, 2013; Bateson and Smith, 2015; Rojo Mendoza, 2015). The apparent 
connection between these two topics, at least in the Mexican case, will hopefully encourage 
more investigation into factors that facilitate vigilantism, and perhaps also spur more 
research on inequality. These phenomena are not only theoretical interesting, but have 






Table 1. Logistic regression of vigilante presence in Mexican municipalities, 2013. 
























Inequality 10.78*** 9.917*** 11.34*** 10.58*** 11.15*** 9.916**  
 (3.727) (3.835) (-3.777) (-3.759) (-3.819) (-4.346) 
Homicide rate .000 .031*** 
  
-.000 .002 
 (.004) (.012) 
  
(-.004) (-.004) 
Homicide rate  -.000***     
squared  (.000)     
Change in    -.006 
   homicide rate   (-.004) 
   Crime rate   
 
-.000 
     
 
(-.000) 
  GDPPC -.0237 .037 -.0274 -.0206 
   (.020) (.128) (-.026) (-.016) 
  GDPPC  -.001     
squared  (.003)     
Libraries per capita    
  
-.006 
    
  
(-.019) 
 Fiscal autonomy   
   
-.045 
   
   
(-.030) 
% population  -.027 .174 -.076 -.103 -.088 -.204 
indigenous (.618) (.619) (-.614) (-.621) (-.614) (-.649) 
Population .536*** .514*** .529*** .585*** .509*** .535*** 
(log) (.136) (.136) (-.135) (-.165) (-.152) (-.17) 
Vigilantes in 3.294*** 3.272*** 3.292*** 3.241*** 3.203*** 3.065*** 
neighbor (.305) (.315) (-.304) (-.316) (-.306) (-.374) 
Urban population -1.984 -2.151 -1.866 -1.76 -2.186 -1.832 
 (1.880) (1.967) (-1.813) (-1.779) (-1.928) (-2.126) 
Migrant remittances .026 .023 .026 .024 .033* .014 
 (.018) (.020) (-.018) (-.018) (-.018) (-.022) 
Constant -14.74*** -14.59*** -14.90*** -14.98*** -14.49*** -13.71*** 
 (1.889) (1.928) (-1.935) (-1.924) (-2.289) (-2.261) 
N 2440 2440 2,440 2,402 2,316 1,322 
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